Flooding, PFAS, and the Urgent Need for Resilient Water Infrastructure in North Carolina

Introduction

When Attorney General Jeff Jackson visited the Hillsborough River Pumping Station after Tropical Storm Chantal inundated the facility, he drew attention to a frozen FEMA funding stream that threatens flood resilience projects across North Carolina. As an environmental scientist who has spent years studying PFAS fate in aqueous systems and advising on state water quality policy, I see this incident not only as a failure of emergency management but also as a stark reminder of how extreme weather can mobilize persistent contaminants like per‑ and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) from wastewater into our rivers and, ultimately, drinking water supplies. The flooding event offers a concrete case study for why resilient infrastructure is inseparable from effective PFAS mitigation.

The Flooding Event and PFAS Risks

The news report notes that millions of gallons of wastewater were released into area rivers when the pumping station overflowed. Wastewater streams are known carriers of PFAS because these chemicals are ubiquitous in household products, firefighting foams, industrial discharges, and biosolids. Even though the PFAS concentrations in municipal wastewater are typically low—often in the low‑nanogram per liter range—the sheer volume of a flood‑driven discharge can translate into a significant mass load entering surface waters.

Once in the river, PFAS can travel downstream, adsorb to sediments, and be taken up by aquatic organisms. In North Carolina, several watersheds that receive treated effluent—such as the Haw and Cape Fear basins—are already monitored for PFAS due to historic industrial releases. An uncontrolled spill of wastewater adds a diffuse, non‑point source of PFAS that complicates source‑tracking efforts and may elevate concentrations in downstream drinking water intakes, especially during low‑flow periods when dilution is limited.

FEMA Funding Freeze and Infrastructure Resilience

FEMA’s Pre‑Disaster Mitigation (PDM) and Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) funds are critical for upgrading pumping stations, installing flood‑proof barriers, and enhancing backup power systems. The freeze that Attorney General Jackson highlighted prevents municipalities from accessing these resources, leaving aging infrastructure vulnerable to repeat failures. In the case of Hillsborough, the pumping station’s design likely predates modern climate‑resilience standards; without federal assistance, retrofits that could prevent overflow—such as elevated electrical components, watertight seals, or real‑time flow monitoring—remain unfunded.

From a PFAS perspective, every avoided overflow reduces the potential for contaminant release. Investing in resilient infrastructure is therefore a preventive measure: it limits the hydraulic load that can scour solids and mobilize sorbed PFAS from pipe sediments, and it maintains the integrity of treatment processes that are designed to remove or destroy these substances before discharge.

NC PFAS Policy Context

North Carolina has been proactive in addressing PFAS contamination. The Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) issued a PFAS Action Plan in 2020 that set health‑based advisory levels for PFOA and PFOS at 10 ppt each, later aligning with the EPA’s forthcoming enforceable Maximum Contaminant Levels (MCLs). In April 2024, the EPA finalized National Primary Drinking Water Regulations for six PFAS, establishing enforceable MCLs of 4.0 ppt for PFOA and PFOS and 10 ppt for PFNA, PFHxS, PFBS, and GenX, alongside a Hazard Index approach for mixtures.

North Carolina’s own regulations require public water systems to monitor for these six PFAS and to report results to DEQ. Systems that exceed the EPA MCLs must implement treatment or develop alternative sources within a defined compliance window. The state has also pursued litigation against PFAS manufacturers to recover remediation costs, underscoring the financial burden that contamination places on municipalities.

When wastewater overflows introduce additional PFAS loads into source waters, water utilities face heightened challenges in meeting these standards. Even advanced treatment technologies—such as granular activated carbon, ion exchange, or high‑pressure membranes—can be overwhelmed by sudden spikes in contaminant mass, leading to breakthrough and potential non‑compliance.

Implications for Municipal Water Systems

Municipal water systems that draw from rivers affected by the Hillsborough spill must consider several immediate and long‑term actions:

1. Enhanced Monitoring: Increase sampling frequency at intake points during and after storm events to capture transient PFAS spikes. Real‑time surrogate parameters (e.g., total organic fluorine) can provide early warnings.
2. Treatment Buffering: Optimize existing treatment trains to handle variable loads—e.g., by adjusting contact time in adsorption beds or employing sequential treatment stages that can be brought online during high‑risk periods.
3. Source‑Water Protection: Advocate for watershed‑scale PFAS source‑identification programs that include wastewater facilities, storm‑water outfalls, and industrial users. Collaborative monitoring can help prioritize mitigation efforts.
4. Emergency Response Planning: Integrate PFAS considerations into flood‑response protocols, ensuring that containment booms, sampling teams, and public notifications are ready when a wastewater release occurs.

These steps are not merely theoretical; they are already being piloted in communities along the Cape Fear River where PFAS contamination has prompted utilities to invest in advanced treatment and real‑time sensor networks.

Call to Action

The intersection of flooding, PFAS contamination, and federal funding freezes creates a policy nexus that demands coordinated action. I urge the following:

• Federal Level: Restore and expand FEMA mitigation grants specifically earmarked for water‑infrastructure resilience projects that address contaminant mobilization risks.
• State Level: NC DEQ should incorporate flood‑scenario modeling into its PFAS risk assessments and prioritize funding for wastewater facility upgrades in high‑risk floodplains.
• Local Level: Municipalities must conduct vulnerability assessments of pumping stations and treatment plants, seeking state and federal assistance to implement flood‑proofing measures before the next storm season.

By treating infrastructure resilience as a frontline defense against PFAS spread, we protect both public health and the integrity of our water resources.

Conclusion

The visit by Attorney General Jeff Jackson to the flooded Hillsborough pumping station is more than a critique of a funding freeze; it is a vivid illustration of how climate‑driven extremes can exacerbate chemical pollution challenges. As a scientist committed to evidence‑based policy, I contend that investing in resilient water infrastructure is not a discretionary expense—it is a necessary safeguard against the spread of PFAS and other contaminants in our rivers and drinking water. Only through sustained federal support, state‑level foresight, and local preparedness can North Carolina ensure that its water systems remain safe, reliable, and protective of community health in an era of intensifying storms.